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Abstract 
Crucial social and cultural elements underpin state institutions and ensure that they function. This is 
true in any context, but it is even more important to understand and truly acknowledge in “fragile” 
ones. Conventional perspectives need to be broadened and need to look at the multiplicity and 
diversity of political institutions (formal and in-formal), cultures and logics through which state 
resilience and state-building processes may be supported. Such an approach would help re-integrate 
the “intangible” dimensions that constitute the substantive content of institutions, their ethos, beyond 
their mere forms. Based upon concrete experiences in different African countries, this paper explains 
what these intangible dimensions are in three of the sectors usually concerned with reforms (politics, 
justice and security), and why they are important and should be better integrated in analyses, 
intervention strategies and aid programmes. An equally important dimension of such integration is that 
it would also allow better consideration of local capacities and resources to be taken, in particular in 
terms of resilience, and would allow it to go beyond the impression of “vacuum” or “chaos” too often 
given to situations of fragility. Finally, the paper presents some concrete recommendations to integrate 
these dimensions better into the priorities and modalities of European aid, as well as suggest a few 
avenues for further research on the subject. 
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This paper will focus on what is sometimes referred as the “intangible” (“invisible”, qualitative) 
dimensions of state resilience and state building. These intangible elements have been increasingly 
integrated in the international agenda aiming at transforming political structures, indicating a better 
understanding and acknowledgement of state–society relationships in situation of “fragility” and of the 
bases on which a society can actually be rebuilt and further conflicts peacefully transformed.
1 
Analyses (including those by international organisations) have been increasingly emphasising the 
importance of the content beyond the mere forms of institutions. For instance, the OCED/DAC Fragile 
States Group has defined state building as “an endogenous process to develop capacity, institutions 
and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relationships”.
2 In another discussion paper, the 
same group noted that: 
 “absent a careful understanding of the way in which the political and social fabric of society is 
expressed institutionally, investment in recreating or building new institutions that mimic the ideal 
Weberian form is often bound to fail. Rather, an open mind with respect to institutional 
arrangements and honest acknowledgement of the social foundations of existing forms of 
organisation is essential.”
3 
Other publications call for an increased attention to the nexus between “formal” and “informal” 
politics. Such analyses actually echo what social sciences have long taught us about the nature and 
diversity of institutions in any given context; of particular interest is their insistence upon an 
awareness of the routines and complexities of the processes shaping institutions, in the (fluid) 
conjoining of the social and the political spheres.
4 Thus, the challenge for outsiders is to capture the 
multiplicity and diversity of political institutions, cultures and logics – in other words, of “modalities 
of governance” – through which state resilience and state building processes may be supported. This 
may refer to institutions which apparently are not political at all but which fulfil different functions, in 
particular, in terms of political socialization, permanent renegotiation of the rules of the game and 
legitimisation of the political system.
5 These non-political institutions may provide what is sometimes 
referred to as the “software” side of statebuilding: social and cultural elements that underpin state 
institutions and that ensure that they function. Notions such as “civic” trust and legitimacy of the state, 
for instance, are now widely considered as central to the functioning of a state and sustainability of 
peace. A number of scholars who have worked and written extensively on statebuilding even consider 
                                                      
*  Paper prepared for the Workshop on “Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration 
Mechanisms”, organised by the European Report of Development in Florence, Italy, 16-17 April 2009. 
1  Bernardo Arévalo de León, Joint Program Unit for UN/Interpeace Initiatives, UNOPS, Peacebuilding Community of 
Practice, Post-Conflict Capacity Development through Attitudinal and Behavioural Change, 15 September 2008. 
2 OECD,  State Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings, August 2008: http://www.oecd.org./dac/fragilestates. 
The OCED/DAC Fragile States Group is a forum that brings together experts on governance, conflict prevention and 
reconstruction from bilateral and multilateral development co-operation agencies to facilitate co-ordination and share 
good practice to enhance development effectiveness in “fragile states”. 
3  OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC 
Discussion Paper, 2008, p. 39. 
4  See, in particular, Samuel N. Eisenstadt, “Institutionalization and Change”, (1964) vol American Sociology Review, p. 
235; Georges Balandier, Anthropologie politique, (Paris: PUF, 1967) (and Reed, Quadrige, 1991). 
5  Anthropological studies on “local-level politics” have underlined this point, particularly in non-western contexts. A good 
example of this kind of investigations may be found in: Thomas Bierschenk & Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (eds), Les 
pouvoirs au village. Le Bénin rural entre démocratisation et centralisation, (Paris: Ed. Karthala, 1998). On post-conflict 
contexts, see Béatrice Pouligny, “Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post-Conflict Societies: Giving Diversity a 
Chance”, (2000) 7:3 International Peacekeeping, pp. 17-35. Béatrice Pouligny 
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that “in many ways, state legitimacy is more important than effectiveness”.
6 This legitimacy may 
sometimes derive from the efficiency of the state, but it also requires a number of socio-political 
processes, such as participation and accountability that are an essential part of the democratic and 
governance agenda. They also include more intangible components related to collective values, 
beliefs, perceptions and expectations attached to the state and what it represents. The same applies to 
the perceptions of justice and the rule of law, security or economic recovery and development. In other 
words, informal institutional forms may be as important as formal ones, as they contribute to 
important dimensions of state functions, in particular (but not only) intangible ones. 
By comparison, the tangible dimensions of statebuilding consist of such things as the number of 
weapons destroyed, soldiers demobilised, laws drafted, judges trained, material delivered, or 
infrastructures rehabilitated or built (for example, clinics, schools, tribunals and roads). Most 
international initiatives aiming at supporting states in fragile contexts have focused primarily on those 
visible, tangible, and quantifiable outputs, rather than on qualitative processes of change, which, 
admittedly, are much more difficult to induce and assess. This approach is sometimes referred to as a 
“programmatic minimalism” – that is, to develop programmes that are “largely replicable, 
standardised, culturally inoffensive and politically ‘neutral’ or uninformed [and that] focus on 
technical procedures and institutions rather than law’s substance and ethos”.
7 Several factors explain 
the pervasiveness of such an approach. Pragmatism: given the formidable obstacles in many fragile 
environments, outsiders, in particular, tend to focus on technical activities (for example, training 
judges, drafting laws, building tribunals, and providing material), as these seem easier to do than 
inducing behavioral and attitudinal changes. They also correspond to immediate needs that require 
important budgets for which most countries totally depend on the international community. 
Transferability: technical know-how is much less problematic to transfer from one context to another 
than political and cultural values.
8 Strategic: the focus is more on short-term, immediate and visible 
results, than on sustainable, long-term impact. Political: a technical approach to these issues is 
partially a way of circumventing contentious debates and accusations of neo-colonialism (namely, that 
international actors are trying to impose outside — mainly western — values).
9 Organisational: 
technical experts tend to capture most of the discussions. In reference to rule of law programmes, 
some critics have cautioned that “the rule of law is too important to be left to lawyers”.
10 This criticism 
could be applied to other sectors of reform. 
As a consequence, in practice, the majority of international programmes focus on the forms and 
structures of institutions, but evade their substantive content — their ethos. For instance, they will 
“focus on law enforcement — as illustrated by the preoccupation with police reform — rather than the 
generation of the rule of law and of public confidence in it”.
11 They will be interested in the formal 
design of institutions more than the social context within which these institutions operate and the 
norms that support them. Yet, in their absence, institutions may appear as mere shells or “empty 
boxes”. In so doing, outsiders simply forget what political anthropologists have taught us: that the 
                                                      
6  The Peacebuilding Roundtable, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre / UN Peacebuilding Support Office / 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 2008, Summary Report, p. 12. 
7  Mark Malloch Brown, “Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” Statement to the 
United Nations Security Council (6 October 2004), p. 85. 
8  See, Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, (Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). 
9  Béatrice Pouligny, “UN Peace Operations, INGOs, NGOs, and Promoting the Rule of Law: Exploring the Intersection of 
International and Local Norms in Different Postwar Contexts”, (2003) 2:3 Journal of Human Rights, p. 374. 
10  Mark Malloch Brown, “Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” Statement to the 
United Nations Security Council (6 October 2004). 
11  Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War, (Malden: Polity Press, 2002), p. 76. State-Society Relations and Intangible Dimensions of State Resilience and State Building: A Bottom-Up Perspective 
3 
“political” must be understood in its “substantial” aspects, its properties, more than in its institutions 
(the formal aspects).
12  
Based upon concrete experiences in different African countries, this paper will first explain what 
these intangible dimensions are in three of the sectors usually concerned with reforms (politics, justice 
and security), and why they are important and should be better integrated in analyses, intervention 
strategies and aid programmes. Indeed, tangible and intangible dimensions of state resilience and state 
building need to be understood in their constant interaction and should deserve equal attention in aid 
programmes.
13 Second, an important dimension of such integration is that it would allow taking better 
consideration of local capacities, in particular in terms of resilience and go beyond the impression of 
“vacuum” too often given of situations of fragility.
 14 The third and final part of the paper will present 
some concrete recommendations to better integrate these dimensions in the priorities and modalities of 
European aid, as well as suggest a few avenues for further research on the subject. 
2. Exploring the intangible dimensions of political, judicial and security reforms 
Crucial social and cultural elements underpin state institutions and ensure that they function. 
Conventional perspectives need to be broadened and look at this wider network of relationships, 
structures and belief systems that support them. Examples in the political, judicial and security sectors 
may help us understand the nature of these decisive components of any reform. 
2.1 Beyond constitutional, governance and electoral reforms: restoring “civic” trust and a political 
community 
2.1.1 Reforming local governance structures: a diversity of conceptions and perceptions 
It has been recognised by many stakeholders that “rebuilding the capacities of the state and the (re-) 
establishment of credible, transparent, participatory and efficient governance and public administration 
institutions in fragile post-conflict settings is the key ingredient to achieving peace, stability and 
sustainable development”.
15 Indeed, there is increasing acceptance of the idea that modern states must 
perform a variety of functions beyond holding the legitimate monopoly on the use of force in a given 
territory.
16 The capability to perform these functions enhances either stability or instability. Failure to 
                                                      
12  Georges Balandier, “Le politique des anthropologues,” in Traité de Science Politique, vol. 1, ed. Madeleine Grawitz and 
Jean Leca (Paris: PUF, 1991), 309–34. On the application of that argument to post-conflict environments, see Beatrice 
Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006), 
97; see also Antonia Potter, The Rule of Law as a Measure of Peace? Responsive Policy for Reconstructing Justice and 
Rule of Law in Post Conflict and Transitional Environments (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, May 2004), 11. 
13  See Béatrice Pouligny et al., (eds), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities, (Tokyo-New York: United 
Nations University Press, 2007), and Barry Hart (ed), Peacebuilding in Traumatized Societies, (Lanham MD: University 
Press of America, 2008). 
14  The notion of resilience generally refers to an individual’s capacity to adapt, survive, and bounce back during or after 
hardship and adversity. This capacity comes from individual characteristics as well as effective social and family 
supports. The notion has been increasingly used to also refer to the capacity of a group, a community or a society at large 
to do the same. It offers an interesting and dynamic perspective on situations of “fragility” as they also present multiple 
resources for the (re-) building process. For an overview of the notion of resilience, see M. Konner, “Trauma, Adaptation, 
and Resilience: A Cross-Cultural and Evolutionary Perspective”, in: L.A. Kirmayer, R. Lemelson & M. Barad, (eds), 
Understanding Trauma. Integrating Biological, Clinical and Cultural Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 2007), p. 322. 
15 UNDESA,  Governance Strategies for Post Conflict Reconstruction, P. 9. 
16  See A. Ghani, C. Lockhart & M. Carnahan, Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building, (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 2005). Béatrice Pouligny 
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perform state functions can lead to loss of trust and legitimacy between citizens and the state, 
perpetuating a further weakening of state functionality (which cyclically then erodes the social 
contract and trust between citizens and the state). The consequences on economic recovery and 
sustainable development are also well known.
17 
In other words, everybody agrees on the centrality of institutions and governance mechanisms. This 
is the broad consensus. But at the implementation stage, the reality is that the notion of governance 
refers to a diversity of conceptions embedded in different historical systems of reference and practices. 
The World Governance Assessment (WGA), a project by the Overseas Development Institute, which 
aims to provide primary data on governance structures from every region of the world, has shown that 
the usual definitions of governance are problematical because they have been informed and 
determined by international development agencies, without incorporating the perspective of local 
stakeholders. This study has been providing primary data that include national and local stakeholder 
perspectives, showing that understandings of governance may relate to different cultural elements and 
assets.
18 Historical and cultural contexts have often shaped public perceptions  of who the 
“authorities” are and what are the existing, at times informal (and even illegal) institutions. While 
outsiders have been gradually integrating a better understanding of how their intervention has a high 
chance of exacerbating the struggle over resource allocation and rent distribution,
19 their 
understanding of the more intangible dimensions that would help them to grasp local understandings 
of governance and, as a consequence, expectations from any reform, remain insufficient. Phenomena 
such as corruption and “black market”, for instance, have been more widely approached in their 
dysfunctional – and, at times, criminal – dimensions than in their functional ones. We tend to adopt a 
very moral approach towards these issues, forgetting that the variety of perceptions and functions 
attached to them in the daily practices will influence any governance reform. 
2.1.2 Intangible dimensions at stake in electoral systems and processes 
In the political sphere, elections are among the most powerful tools for accountability and 
legitimation of the state. In general, electoral processes are perceived as a way of extending 
participation and of legitimating a particular government. In accordance with the idea of social 
contract, elections can provide a government with legitimacy and breathing space to develop state 
capacity. This benefit of electoral processes is often under-estimated or ignored in the literature. 
Conversely, elections can also increase the salience of a lack of social cohesion or agreement on the 
nature of the social contract. But to play their role fully, electoral processes must be understood in a 
broader context – encompassing the substance of the democratic project itself — and not only as a 
stand-alone rather technical event.
20 Many intangible elements need to be understood and fully taken 
into consideration in order to support any electoral process correctly, in particular in contexts of 
fragility. Actors involved in the field have noted that the vitality of catering electoral systems to 
context cannot be sufficiently emphasised. A given electoral system will not necessarily work the 
same way in different countries. Important determinants include the socio-political context in which it 
                                                      
17 See, for instance, Graciana del Castillo, Economic Reconstruction in Post-conflict Transitions: Lessons for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), (Paris: OECD, 2003), 5. 
18  See Goran Hyden, Julius Court & Kenneth Mease. Making Sense of Governance: The Need for Involving Local 
Stakeholders, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2003). 
19  See, for instance, United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned WGLL/12/07, 
Background Note: Local Governance and Decentralization in Post-War Contexts, (New York: United Nations, 2007), 
pp. 2-3. 
20  Béatrice Pouligny, “The Limits of Imposed ‘Procedural Democracy’ in Post-War Societies”, in: Peace Operations Seen 
from Below, (London: Hurst / Bloomfield CT: Kumarian, 2006), p. 239. Andrew Ellis, “Elections Are Not an Island: The 
Process of Negotiating and Designing Post-Conflict Electoral Institutions”, (paper presented at the conference, “Post-
Conflict Elections in West Africa: Challenges for Democracy and Reconstruction,” Accra, Ghana, 15-17 May 2006). State-Society Relations and Intangible Dimensions of State Resilience and State Building: A Bottom-Up Perspective 
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is used, such as how a society is structured in terms of ideological, religious, ethnic, racial, regional, 
linguistic, or class divisions.
21 The issues of boundary de-limitation and voter registration are 
particularly crucial from this perspective. They not only define voter constituencies, but also refer to 
more fundamental questions related to the definition of “nationality” and “citizenship”, the recognition 
of equal citizenship and (re-) allocation of resources. Various contexts, such as Sudan, the Ivory Coast, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have shown how decisive those “intangible” 
dimensions can be, beyond the immediate interests at stake in the elections.
22 
2.1.3 “Civic” trust and political community in constitutional processes 
The same is true of activities and programmes surrounding the revision or drafting of a Constitution as 
a document that (re-) affirms core values of a society, institutes rights, and lays out the framework to 
reform the state apparatus (i.e., the rules for the allocation and exercise of power, in particular the 
separation of, and relationships between, powers)
23 in order to build trust, with the aim of building a 
political community and thus entrenching a basis for state legitimacy. In some circumstances, 
reforming or drafting a new constitution may be imperative to (re-) establishing the basis of civic trust 
and of state legitimacy. Multiple intangible dimensions are at stake in that process. 
One important component of any constitution is the definition of citizenship, an element that also 
relates to identities. Constitutions exist also to ensure the inalienable rights of every citizen, ideally 
without distinction as to race, religion, sex, or belief. These key functions explain why many 
negotiations surrounding the settlement of armed conflict apply to the modifications envisioned to this 
regard in the constitution; attention to these issues is equally important as a preventive measure.  
Trust and the attachment to common values essential to any political community are intimately 
linked to the modalities chosen to draft a new constitution or revise an existing one. They imply that 
“the diverse groups that constitute the population of the country have agreed to live together”.
24 The 
process through which a constitution is drafted or amended is therefore decisive. While the 
formulation of constitutions was originally the result of negotiations between élites, behind closed 
doors, participation and deliberation are now conceived as an inherent feature in the technical process 
of drawing up a constitution, which “has become one criterion of a legitimate process”.
25 Participatory 
constitution-making (or reform) is generally recommended as it provides a unique opportunity to 
encourage a process that promotes national reconciliation and the creation of a national vision for the 
future of the country. Today, most scholars and practitioners alike agree that this requires not only the 
traditional (top-down) approach of constitution-building and reform, but also the modern, popular 
(bottom-up) one.
26 Such recognition means that appropriate mechanisms are needed (with adequate 
support by donors) for debate and deliberation that include populations’ views on constitutional 
decisions. In some cases, “public opinion is sought before a draft is prepared, as was done in Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Thailand, Eritrea and Kenya, so that, even if the agenda for reform has been identified in 
                                                      
21  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Electoral Systems and Processes”, in: Governance in Post-Conflict 
Situations, (New York: UNDP, 2004), p. 5; Benjamin Reilly, “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies”, (2002) 13:2 
Journal of Democracy, pp. 167-68. 
22  Béatrice Pouligny, “The Limits of Imposed ‘Procedural Democracy’ in Post-War Societies”, in: Peace Operations Seen 
from Below, (London: Hurst / Bloomfield CT: Kumarian, 2006), p. 244. 
23  Yash Ghai & Guido Galli, Constitution Building Processes and Democratization, (Stockholm: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006), p. 8. 
24  Ibid., 9. 
25 Vivien  Hart,  Democratic Constitution Making, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 2003), p. 5. 
26  Vivien Hart, “Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict”, (2001) 26:2 Peace and Change, p. 169. Béatrice Pouligny 
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advance, it can be broadened by reference to the needs and aspirations expressed by the people”.
27 
This requires, at a minimum, a substantial civic education campaign, vital to empowering people to 
understand their roles, responsibilities, and rights in this capacity.
28 In the recent past, successful 
processes “have involved extensive education programmes and a process of consultation and 
discussion. They have encouraged national debate and allowed representatives from key political and 
civil groups to discuss and develop a plan for the county’s political future, largely on a consensus 
basis.”
29 
More fundamentally, a Constitution aims at restoring a political community. In most cases, this is 
largely a “re-imagined” one, in the sense that it is not about restoring a pre-existing community or an 
ideal image that would already be available. In the words of the scholar Andrew Schapp: 
“Faith in the possibility of community enables a collective reckoning with the past in terms of 
which former enemies might eventually arrive at a shared understanding of what went before.”
30 
This means that some forms of political reconciliation are also needed. This political process needs to 
be understood both as a bottom-up and top-down one in which “collective and individual imaginations 
find ways to create a relatively small set of shared meanings and patterns of thought that will create a 
perception of safety, in which more complex forms of shared meanings and mutuality might grow”.
31 
In post-conflict societies, these processes are neither linear nor easy, particularly as the coping 
mechanisms used by individuals may be “anchored not in deep community-based mechanisms, but 
rather in the essential individual struggle for survival”.
32 This observation made by Peter Uvin, based 
upon his experiences in Burundi, echoes, in part, his diagnosis about Rwanda.
33 This diagnosis is not 
limited to those two countries. The difficulty of fostering collective action, given extreme poverty as 
well as high levels of distrust within society, and between society and the state, is quite common in so-
called “fragile” environments. It constitutes a great obstacle to the (re-) building of both a political 
community and a vital civil society. Indeed, civil society actors may also assume uncivil roles or be as 
discredited as political élites. Thus, they are likely to be distrusted by the general population. One key 
anchor highlighted by most of the literature is the building of some kind of trust and confidence not 
only in others, in terms of shared norms and values, but also in the state and its institutions. Indeed, 
“if genuine co-existence is to take place, then the building of trust is indispensable. If trust is absent, 
citizens will not be prepared to invest their energies in the consolidation of democracy.”
34 It is referred 
to as “civic” trust, in the sense that it can develop among citizens who are members of the same 
political community, but who are, nonetheless, strangers to one another. 
“In this view, reconciliation is the condition under which citizens can once again trust one another 
as citizens. That means that they are sufficiently committed to the norms and values that motivate 
their ruling institutions; sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also 
                                                      
27  Ibid. See, also, Yash Ghai, “The Constitution Reform Process: Comparative Perspectives”, (paper presented at the 
conference, “Toward Inclusive and Participatory Constitution Making”, Kathmandu, Nepal, 3-4 August 2004). 
28  Yash Ghai & Guido Galli, Constitution Building Processes and Democratization (Stockholm: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006), p. 14. 
29  Kirsti Samuels, “Constitutional Choices and Statebuilding in Postconflict Countries”, in: Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk 
(eds),  The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, (London: 
Routledge, 2008). 
30 Andrew  Schapp,  Political Reconciliation, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), p. 9. 
31  Roberta Culbertson & Béatrice Pouligny, “Re-imagining Peace after Mass Crime: A Dialogical Exchange between 
Insider and Outsider Knowledge”, in: Béatrice Pouligny et al., (eds), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and 
Communities, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), pp. 272-273. 
32 Peter  Uvin,  Life after Violence: A People’s History of Burundi, (London: Zed Books, 2008), pp. 166-167. 
33  Sue Unsworth and Peter Uvin. A New Look at Civil Society Support in Rwanda?, (Draft, Oct. 7, 2002). 
34  Alexander L Boraine, “Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation”, (2006) 60:1 Journal of International Affairs, pp. 
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on this basis; and sufficiently secure about their fellow citizens’ commitment to abide by these 
basic norms and values.”
35  
However, this is a long process: “One cannot expect that this will happen immediately. Trust can be 
broken in an instant but may take years to be re-established”.
36 “Civic” trust as here understood is not 
just a state of mind but a host of conditions that make institutions trustworthy.
37 
These processes do not generally emerge by themselves; they are not engendered by the mere 
passage of time, either.
38 They need to be supported by appropriate and innovative reconciliation 
programmes deeply rooted in the cultures and realities of the society concerned, so that they are 
meaningful to local actors and empower them.
39 They should not be considered as a peripheral 
activity. Yet, the reality of international aid is that programmes that aim at supporting the 
reconciliation process and targeting specific elements of it often look marginal in comparison to the 
large focus put on more tangible programmes; they are usually constrained by time and inadequate 
resources on the part of donors, whose practices do not match what is needed.
40 
2.1.4 Memories, historical narratives and the formation of collective identities 
Memorialisation and history work are other examples of programs that can assist in those difficult 
tasks. They help access crucial intangible aspects of state resilience and statebuilding related to issues 
of culture, dignity and the formation of collective narratives and identities.
41  
“Various studies have shown that memory is intrinsically linked to identity and the transmission of 
memory and history in a post-conflict period can play a significant role in evolving new identities 
of citizenship. […] While national narratives often portray a selective version of the past in an 
attempt to build a national identity and consolidate new political identities, narratives within the 
home and school have the potential to provide alternative versions of the past to provide a more 
holistic picture of events of the past as well as promote a critical citizenship.”
42 
Actors engaged in peacebuilding and democratization processes “link their projects and their 
orientations toward the future with the memories of their violent and conflictive past.”
43 This is even 
more important in societies involved in nation building processes after widespread violence. Having a 
sense of a shared history is a central component in that formation of new collective identities and 
political communities.  
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Memorialisation presents a powerful arena for such processes, in particular, as it works with 
contested memory.
44 
“When memory projects go beyond the role of museums to become centers of discourse on the 
past, they become living examples of the reconciliation process, signifying the population’s 
recognition of the past and its affirmation of a different future. […]They are critical to the process 
of deepening a country’s democracy by creating avenues for building trust and mutual 
understanding. Identity is forged and renewed, networks of communication are developed, and 
society is reconfigured, all of which can contribute significantly to a successful transition to 
democracy, the creation of functional democratic institutions, and a more unified society.”
45 
National and international researchers generally agree that a fundamental goal of history education is 
to “transmit ideas of citizenship and both the idealized past and the promised future of the 
community”.
46 It is not surprising, then, that reforms to history education are nearly always specifically 
about changing the representations of the political community’s past and changing methodology “to 
promote tolerance, inclusiveness, an ability to deal with conflict non-violently, and the capacity to 
think critically and question assumptions that could again be manipulated to instigate conflict”.
47 It is 
often complemented by the concept of “peace [or peacebuilding] education”, which seeks to support 
“an educational process that allows students to articulate, accommodate and accept differences 
between and within groups […]. This entails a distinct two-fold process that nurtures and constructs 
positive inter-group relations while marginalising and deconstructing negative inter-group relations”.
48 
Yet, little attention has been paid so far to the integration of these programmes in the overall 
statebuilding process; they are very low priorities. The question of schooling itself is generally 
approached by donors in relation to employment and economic development, not in relation to the 
intangible dimensions of conflict transformation and statebuilding. As a consequence, teaching of 
history, social studies and the humanities in pre- and post-conflict societies has been considered a low 
priority; instead, more emphasis is placed on subjects seen to have practical value for competition in 
the global marketplace, such as foreign languages, maths, science, technology, and vocational 
training.
49 
This is even more the case of trauma and psycho-social recovery issues, in particular in post-
violent and post-war contexts, which constitute a high proportion of fragile situations. 
“Despite growing evidence of the consequences of trauma, concrete actions to address these 
‘invisible wounds’ are unexpectedly still often inadequate, if not entirely missing, from paradigms 
of assistance and development employed by relief and development organizations in post conflict 
transition.”
50  
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Yet, trauma may induce, among other things, “the loss of basic trust in the order of things”.
51 At the 
society level, unprocessed blows may have strong impact on a people’s sense of identity and self-
esteem.
52 Specific traumatic events, termed by some psychiatrists as “chosen traumas”, may become 
transformed or glorified in the retelling to subsequent generations, and may be used to incite revenge 
and justify efforts to restore the honour or dignity of the victimised group.
53 Almost all opinions of 
psychiatrists and psychologists coincide in emphasising the intergenerational effects of trauma.
54 
When individuals, families and societies cannot cope with their (past) trauma, there is a high 
likelihood that they will pass it on to the next generation. This transgenerational trauma is also 
sometimes referred to as “historical trauma”, and requests specific healing processes.
55 Here, official 
discourses and initiatives may play as important a role as more targeted psychosocial programmes. 
“The public narrations of the past, those that are authorized or official, such as celebrations, 
commemorations, and monuments, can lend meaning to individual memories and give to the new 
generation the possibility of facing the ‘unthinkable’: the attempt to make a whole society 
disappear. But official memories can, conversely, mutilate personal memories.”
56  
These processes refer to highly intangible dimensions of state resilience and statebuilding, but they 
are crucial. 
2.2 The transformation of collective beliefs in relation to justice and the rule of law 
The transformation of collective beliefs and perceptions plays an equally crucial role in relation to 
justice and rule of law. As Thomas Carothers noted, “law is not just the sum of courts, legislatures, 
police, prosecutors, and other formal institutions with some direct connection to law. Law is also a 
normative system that resides in the minds of the citizens of a society”.
57 It refers to “a certain number 
of collective representations regarding the figure of the state, the judicial apparatus and the police”.
58 
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Yet, in the own words of the former administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, 
Mark Malloch Brown: 
“Too often international assistance on the rule of law has ignored the link between the rule of law 
and politics. Assistance is often technocratic and apolitical in nature, focusing on the transfer of 
technical know-how to state institutions and on the technical modernization of institutions such as 
the courts and the police.”
59 
The choice of a “technical” approach and consequent neglect of the socio-political and cultural 
dimensions of judicial and legal reforms may have various consequences. First, “the primary tool or 
the most favoured method for promoting rule of law in crisis states is to transplant and borrow laws 
and institutions”.
60 This can lead to constitutions, laws, and legislations, written by the international 
community, which, while often of high quality, are never accepted or implemented by the national 
stakeholders.
61 This is particularly true in cases where international actors pressure countries to 
incorporate international standards extensively into local legislations. A consequence of this tendency 
is that, on paper, many laws of fragile countries may appear much more respectful of human rights 
than those in many democratic countries, but have little to do with the reality, with what is actually 
enforced. This is even more so in contexts where the local law itself “has been no more than a paper 
somewhere which has nothing to do with the reality and the informal rules that have been developed, 
along the history, by both the rulers and the population”.
62 
Another consequence is that institutional reform, or reforming formal institutions such as the 
judiciary, police, etc., may become the end goal of, rather than the means to, statebuilding. Although 
reforming or (re-) building institutions is essential, it may not have a direct and tangible impact on the 
state of rule of law in a given society; in particular, it does not say anything about the nature of the 
“order” these institutions are meant to uphold. As a result, a technical focus on institutional reform 
tends to direct assistance at the symptoms rather than the causes of the problem and forgetting that 
achieving rule of law ends requires political and cultural, not only institutional, change.
63 Among 
other risks, experts tend to “reproduce technical solutions and rely on ‘template’ strategies that fail to 
integrate adequate conflict analysis in their design, in that they are not based on a thorough 
understanding of the political situation in a given country”.
64 They are even less informed by local 
norms and practices. Outsiders tend to “shy away from knowledge and integration of cultural and 
historical specificities and needs of individual societies, and engage local populations only minimally 
in their programmes”.
65 Lessons from the past have shown that one-size-fits-all approaches do not lead 
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to meaningful changes. At a minimum, some knowledge of local collective history could help 
outsiders to understand better the diversity of conceptions of politics, power, justice, or the state within 
a given society.
66 Indeed, “the ‘rule of law’, far from being a foundation, as may be sometimes implied 
by the discourse of foreign intervention, is the product of concrete histories, the expression of 
worldviews and social relations”.
67 It cannot be constructed without integrating local actors’ different 
frames of reference and organisation, with all their historical baggage, including their relation to other 
cultures. 
2.3 Safety perceptions and attitudes towards security issues in fragile contexts 
Regarding the reforms in the security sector, two examples illustrate the equal importance of those 
“intangible” dimensions. One of the most pressing issues on the agenda of many “fragile” states is 
the reduction of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Most studies have now shown the importance 
of looking not only on the supply-side of the issue, but also the “demand-side”, examining the reasons 
why individuals or groups “want” or “desire” these weapons. Questions such as: “Why do people 
possess and buy small arms? What are the political, economic and social functions of guns, and what 
ideas (about violence, security, justice, authority, self, gender, etc.) inform these?” are the topic of 
focus.
68 This exploration of “motivations” for SALW acquisition requires the input of multiple 
expertises: anthropologists, criminologists, psychologists, sociologists, and behavioral economists. For 
instance, sociologist, Jacklyn Cock who analyses social violence through values, social practices, and 
institutions, has argued that the desire for guns in South Africa is a socially constructed concept that is 
embedded in culture and different social identities.
69 Her work explores the dynamics of collective 
identities and power relations, and how social categories have the power to define deficiency or threat. 
Such approaches emphasise the fact that from the society’s perspective, disarmament is more than just 
about putting weapons beyond use and facilitating their collection; it is also about changing attitudes. 
How different people conceive the ownership of a weapon in a specific cultural and political context is 
very important in this respect. In many countries, to deprive a male inhabitant of his gun is like 
questioning his virility. Here the preliminary realization of good SALW surveys helps contextualise the 
work to be done, as well as the local resources than can be mobilised. Such studies conducted in the 
case of Burundi, for instance, have highlighted the variation of perceptions between rural and urban 
areas, and the importance of much localised parameters that would influence the efficiency and 
legitimacy of any programme aiming at reducing small arms.
70 In Kenya, similar studies have shown 
that perception of criminal activity (even more than reality) is the key factor that drives the demand for 
firearms. A study conducted by the Institute for Security Studies in Nairobi concluded that 
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“perceptions of firearms and security are as crucial as the actual reality of firearm proliferation, crime 
and conflict, in guiding policy development and implementation.”
71 
The same is true of the sense of safety, which is a highly subjective process. “Assessments of 
security ‘problems’ and ‘needs’ tend to be highly subjective in nature, and where this is done 
exclusively through the filter of donor concepts such as ‘human security’ or ‘SSR’, there is a risk that 
the peculiarities of local perceptions of security will be downplayed or ignored.”
72 In any given 
country, different stakeholders may also perceive and define their security problems in different ways. 
These may be influenced by a wide range of emotionally, socially and culturally traumatic events, 
losses, isolation, the destruction of social norms and codes of behaviour that most individuals and 
communities face in fragile situations, which are often characterised by a high level of violence and 
unpredictability in the daily life. In different fragile contexts, such as in Haiti and Eastern Congo 
(DRC), a micro-analysis of local perceptions of insecurity may also help prevent violence against 
civilians and protect local populations, which is an increasing concern for the international 
community. 
______________________ 
The weight of these intangibles elements may explain the perception that, “sometimes, the most 
scarce resource in a fractured society is not funding or institutional capacities: it is the sheer will to 
stay together”.
73 However, if we start looking more closely at local societies and communities’ frames 
of reference, values and conceptions, we also discover “sources of resilience and coping, traditional 
beliefs that colour interpretations of one’s war experiences, and local resources for healing and 
providing assistance.”
74 These processes not only help people to cope with the situation; they often 
contribute to support its transformation. “This is community not as a utopian or communitarian goal, 
but community in reality; social groups engaging in some sort of social life.”
75 I would now like to 
explain how looking at the intangible dimensions of state resilience and state-building actually helps 
better identify the resources and mechanisms at play, and bypass the impression of “vacuum” that is 
too often given of the most fragile situations, in particular, in post-conflict countries. 
______________________ 
3. Accessing local resources and the resilience capacity of societies and states 
3.1 Beyond the impression of a “vacuum” 
In many situations, institutions are devastated, dysfunctional, or illegitimate, or even all of the above, 
which means that the infrastructure is devastated, there is very low human capacity with few, if any, 
qualified personnel, and the population has a deep mistrust and lack of faith in state. Then, the 
challenge may appear to be actually to create, rather than to reform or even to reconstruct local 
structures; institutions have to be created anew, not just adapted, and old institutions must be de-
constructed in order to gain a population’s faith in the institutions and lend them legitimacy. In such 
circumstances, the impression may often well be that the state apparatus and new institutions need to 
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be rebuilt almost from scratch, in conditions that are sometimes qualified as of “virtual anarchy”.
76 
This explains the frequent reference to notions such as “security vacuum” or “rule of law vacuum”, for 
instance.
77 However, experience has shown us again and again that “no such vacuum exists, even 
when the state structures have collapsed completely. People will always need ways of settling their 
disputes, and if there is no more formal way of doing so, they resort to other means”.
78 As some 
scholars have observed, “in fact, most of the security and justice in post-conflict and fragile states is 
not carried out by the state police and judiciary, but by non-state security and justice organisations”.
79 
The same is true of other needs that any society has: people cope with everyday life by relying on 
“culturally informed practices”.
80 Paying attention to these existing mechanisms allows us to gain a 
more accurate understanding of the needs of people, the obstacles as well as the possibilities and 
resources to (re-) build a functioning and supportive state/society relationship. Even in situations that 
have often been qualified as “anarchist”, as in Somalia or Eastern Congo (DRC), experience has 
shown that a variety of actors have been fulfilling, in part, the functions that we would expect from the 
state (even though it may be in a very dysfunctional way, at least in some cases, an aspect that I will 
address later in the paper). 
3.2 Examples of community mechanisms supporting the management of security threat, delivering 
justice and facilitating reintegration  
Local mechanisms may exist and need to be taken into consideration when aiming at reforming 
existing institutions. This section of the paper will explain what these mechanisms are and provide a 
few concrete examples. 
In the security sector, community efforts aiming at reducing the security threats created by the 
proliferation of small arms or at facilitating the re-integration of ex-combatants and rebuilding the 
trust between them and local communities, emphasise the importance of local values and intangible 
elements of the local cultures to build sustainable institutions. Several of these mechanisms are 
actually also part of traditional and informal justice systems, which encompass a wide array of social 
goals including accountability, truth-telling, reparation, and reconciliation.
81 I would like to present a 
few examples of such mechanisms. 
In Kenya, the Kuria community has put in place its own governance mechanism to face the huge 
increase in cattle rustling, aggravating violence within the community and neighbouring 
communities.
82 The inability of the police to deal effectively with criminal elements and the 
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community’s loss of faith in the state’s ability to maintain security led to the introduction of the 
“Sungusungu” initiative as an alternative mechanism to deal with the problem of small arms.
83 The 
term Sungusungu is a Swahili word for “a species of large black biting ant”.
84 The Sungusungu is an 
indigenous system of governance, which may have been copied from Tanzania;
85 it was used to deal 
with conflicts, wars and violent crimes before the advent of modern governance.
86 The system’s 
composition, process and methods originated from iritongo, an indigenous age-old local government 
mechanism. It had three components, corresponding to three levels of power: the incharma, which 
takes the appeal from iritongo; the iritongo which investigates, judges and punishes; and the ichisaiga 
which has been replaced by sungusungu and acts as the enforcement mechanism of iritongo. The 
system combines prosecution and enforcement responsibilities. 
“The process of an oath involves the suspect standing on seven magic sticks placed on top of a 
bare anthill completely naked in full view of his relatives and friends who must attend. The oath-
taker raised his hands and recited the words: ‘I am not the person who stole the complaint’s 
property. If I am lying, I’ll be destroyed by the oath.’ The complaint will then follow the same 
process and say the following: ‘I know the suspect stole my cattle. If I’m accusing him falsely, I’ll 
be destroyed by the oath.’ It is believed by the community members that the curse does not only 
affect the suspect alone; it can affect other family members and relatives and even his 
descendants.”
87 
The system enables local people to “dispense, to all intents and purposes, with the costly, inefficient, 
and corrupt services of the police, whom many villagers dismiss as ‘useless.’ In their place it provides 
them with ‘law enforcers’ who are of the community and accountable to it. It dramatically reduces the 
out-of-pocket costs of law enforcement, because the fees paid to sungusungu are lower than the bribes 
habitually demanded by the police, and because all fees and fines collected by sungusungu remain 
within the community, to finance not only the work of sungusungu but also other worthy village 
projects. And, lastly, it enables local people to punish fellow villagers who have transgressed the law 
of their friends and neighbours by administering beatings and levying fines, but without handing them 
over to the formal justice system, which they see as indifferent, if not hostile, to their needs, and over 
which they have no control”.
88 
Other mechanisms address the delicate issue of demobilisation and re-integration of former 
soldiers. Various scholars such as Kees Kingma have argued that there had been no in-depth studies 
on the place of demobilised soldiers in society, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa.
89 This is, indeed, a 
vital aspect of re-integration that local communities have often tried to address, while aid programmes 
tend to neglect it. For instance, in Mozambique and Northern Uganda, traditional rituals have been 
used to facilitate the re-integration of former child soldiers. In Mozambique, mediums and traditional 
healers (kimbanda) helped with the peaceful re-integration of former combatants and former child 
soldiers, through purification rituals involving the whole community. Referring to concepts of 
pollution and purification, they not only made it possible to designate and describe the period of 
violence as “abnormal”, as “unacceptable”, but also to re-define the rules indispensable for the group’s 
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co-existence and survival.
90 These actions demonstrate the success of strategies, which are deeply 
rooted in the social and cultural context, and take into consideration the subjective and psychiatric 
dimensions of the re-integration process. Whereas the Re-integration Support Scheme (RSS) used by 
UNDP probably helped combatants in their economic re-insertion by providing them with a steady 
source of income, most observers consider the role played by traditional healers as key in some of the 
“success stories” registered in that country, in particular for child soldiers. At least some of them 
benefited from a true re-integration in their status of children, although they were generally not re-
integrated into their home community. 
In Northern Uganda, traditional Acholi rituals such as the “stepping on the egg” ceremony (nyouo 
tong gweno) and, to a lesser extent, “drinking the bitter herb” (mato oput) currently play key roles in 
the reconciliation and re-integration of ex-combatants or abductees into their communities.
91 The 
“Stepping on the Egg” (Nyono Tong Gweno) ceremony involves “the returnee stepping on an egg 
(tongweno) placed on a ‘slippery branch’ (opobo) and a stick with a fork (layebi), traditionally used to 
open granaries. The egg is said to symbolise purity…[and] also symbolises that which is ‘soft,’ 
‘fragile,’ suggesting a restoration of innocence. The opobo is a soapy, slippery branch, which helps to 
cleanse the returnee from any external influences he or she might have encountered in the ‘bush’ that 
might be calling them back. The layebi is a symbol of welcoming a person back into the home, where 
the family members will once again share food together”.
92 In the context of the current conflict, “it is 
widely thought that abductees need no more than the simple cleansing ceremony, while ex-combatants 
also need mato oput”.
93 
3.3 Facilitating broader resilience 
As exemplified by these examples, cleansing ceremonies and rituals are equally concerned with issues 
of community re-integration, the peaceful coexistence of former antagonists, and the psychosocial 
recovery of war survivors. But they also fulfil broader functions which are important for the psycho-
social and political resilience of both the individuals concerned and society at large. This is an 
important aspect of these community mechanisms and explains their interest in the approach of 
“fragility”. Three dimensions are particularly worth underlying: 
•  The contribution to the transformation of world views; 
•  The contribution to broader forms of governance; 
•  The support to community re-integration and trust, which often includes the re-inforcement of 
the acceptance of the collective rules and the restoration of harmony within the community. 
3.3.1 Transforming world views 
Rituals help transform worldviews and enable people to make sense of the larger conflict. At times 
when worldviews are crumbling, rituals can create new ways of thinking and may dramatically alter 
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the ways people see the world. They can also make conflict less destructive by reframing the issues at 
stake and allowing people to approach problems in new ways.
94 
“Rather than focusing on the particular rules applied in situations of dispute, this perspective 
examines the ways social groups conceive of ordering, of social relationships, and of ways of 
determining truth and justice. Law is not simply a set of rules exercising coercive power, but a 
system of thought by which certain forms of relations come to seem natural and taken for granted, 
modes of thought that are inscribed in institutions that exercise some coercion in support of their 
categories and theories of explanation.”
95  
3.3.2 Contributing to broader forms of governance 
Moreover, in many cases, these systems (often qualified as “traditional” and “informal”) are also 
broader forms of governance that go beyond dispute resolution as their leaders and operators may be 
also involved in the day-to-day functioning of their village or community. Traditional systems 
operating outside the confines of the state are usually the primary forms of social control, dispute 
resolution, and reconciliation, especially with regard to familial matters and land tenure issues, which 
are numerous in the aftermath of a war and are exacerbated by the displacements of population and 
return of refugees. Although they may have been seriously affected and altered by violence, there is a 
general assumption that they are likely to remain more intact than formal ones.
96 Particularly in the 
justice sector, “they are often more accessible to poor and disadvantaged people and may have the 
potential to provide quick, cheap and culturally relevant remedies”.
97 
3.3.3 Supporting community re-integration and trust 
It is generally believed that one unique contribution of these systems is that they foster social trust and 
community re-integration, in particular, in the aftermath of violence. This belief stems from the 
observation that they are almost invariably based upon communitarian notions of order and 
community, meaning that the primary issue at stake is the well-being of the community at large, and 
not only the interests of the victim. A dispute between individuals is perceived as “not merely...a 
matter of curiosity regarding the affairs of one’s neighbour, but in a very real sense a conflict that 
belongs to the community itself”.
98 Each member of the community is tied to varying degrees to each 
of the disputants and, depending on the extent of these ties, will either feel some sense of having being 
wronged or some sense of responsibility for the wrong. In other words, “a conflict between two 
members of a community is regarded as a problem which afflicts the entire community. In order to 
restore harmony, therefore, there must be general satisfaction among the community at large, as well 
as the disputants, with the procedure and the outcome of the case. Public consensus is, moreover, 
necessary to ensure enforcement of the decision through social pressure.”
99 Justice, in this view, is 
essentially concerned with the restoration of a community’s moral order and social harmony. 
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Justice in a strictly retributive sense (that is, meting out punishment) is generally not the exclusive, 
or even primary, objective of traditional/informal systems. As one report on traditional justice in 
Africa points out, “the traditional African sense of justice is not simply about isolating the retributive 
aspects of justice, as it is in the Western model. Instead, retribution is but one part of an overarching 
process that also encompasses rehabilitation, reconciliation, compensation, and restoration. In other 
words, it is not just that retribution equals justice. Indeed, justice itself is one component of restoring 
perpetrators back into harmony with the values of a community”.
100 While the more formalised 
Western models allow for only one form of justice – retributive, restorative, or reparative – these 
traditional institutions seek to combine various of these and other elements in keeping with the values 
of the community.
101 
This holistic approach also includes the utilization of rituals, rites and symbols. “Genuine 
acceptance of a ruling is recognised as essential for the ending of hostilities between disputants and the 
restoration of harmony within the community. In order to confirm acceptance by both parties, they 
may be expected to eat from the same bowl or drink from the same cup. This forms part of the 
reconciliatory approach intrinsic to African traditional arbitration. It confirms the agreement and 
makes it notorious. The public also partake in the eating and drinking as an expression of the 
communal element inherently present in any individual conflict and of their acceptance of the offender 
back into the community.”
102 A large diversity of rites and symbols are used in different cultures. 
These range from very elaborate celebrations and ceremonies to more common rituals. These may 
include blood pact alliances, marriage, intimate friendships, and communal celebrations to consolidate 
peace. Others include eating and drinking together, the shaking of hands, and the exchange of gifts to 
show the restoration of peace, as well as the slaughter of animals, and the exchange of dried coffee 
beans.
103 
As a result, traditional/informal justice is thought “to strengthen levels of social trust and civic 
engagement within these societies, for, if the people believe in and trust such mechanisms, it is 
believed that they will participate in the activities promoted by them”.
104 Because traditional/informal 
justice systems are, by definition, local and community-based, it is believed that they will foster the 
reconstruction of social trust among survivors. 
3.4 Beyond romantic and essentialist visions, putting local ‘tradition’ under scrutiny 
In no way does this mean that everything that is “local” or “traditional” is “good”. In particular, 
traditional and informal mechanisms may have been tainted in the process of violence and war and 
“must be subjected to scrutiny by communities seeking to re-assert a reality that is not war-based. […] 
Without some outside tools and options local communities may remain trapped in the power of war-
based structures of thought, with little to move them to another perspective.”
105 Moreover, these 
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systems often entail significant drawbacks and dangers, especially regarding human rights, gender 
equality and the rights of juveniles.
106 Thus, their capacity to contribute to the different dimensions of 
political and social reconstruction must be assessed in relation to a certain number of limitations that 
can be observed in a variety of contexts, but, more specifically, in post-conflict situations: the erosion 
and potential distortion of traditional authorities and norms;
107 the risk of abuse of power and 
domination patterns;
108 the risk of political manipulation;
109 the question of the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the system; and the limited applicability across regions/ethnic groups. However, these 
limitations should not imply that we should ignore them. As for any other actor or institution, 
traditional and informal mechanisms must be subject to a detailed and contextualised assessment. 
Their limitations are also generally perceived as better addressed by the involvement of local civil 
society actors as they may help promote and support necessary change and adaptation in existing 
systems. Some argue that donors and governments should engage with traditional/informal systems 
precisely to address their problematical features. As one report puts it, “the fact that these may not 
correspond to our concept of justice, or fully comply with international standards, is, in reality, only 
another reason why we should engage with them. If we are seeking to guarantee a quality of justice 
rather than just recreating a formal structure, work with the informal justice structures becomes an 
imperative”.
110 Another author argues that “we need to develop strategies to take advantage of the 
benefits of informal systems while encouraging appropriate reforms”.
111 
Part of the difficulties comes from the fact that traditional practices may be improperly 
romanticised as somehow intrinsically benign, monolithic in construction, and conducive to harmony. 
However, customary laws “have undergone their own troubled history and evolution, and their content 
may not necessarily be uniformly acceptable to all citizens or communities in the country”.
112 Moving 
beyond the simplistic, romantic, and essentialist traps, an alternative conceptualisation is one that 
emphasises that traditions are dynamic—constantly changing and being changed according to 
evolutions in the societies in which they are embedded. As noted in an insightful ethnographic study of 
northern Ugandan traditional justice practices: 
“These practices, far from being dislocated in a past that no longer exists, have always continued 
to be situated socially. They are called upon and performed to address present concerns. Of course, 
like any culturally informed practice, with time they shift in meaning and appearance.”
113 
In other words, “innovation is part of every culture’s reality, and […] borrowing and grafting ideas 
from the outside and reshaping old concepts to new experiences are also important local strategies”.
114 
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Indeed, traditional or informal practices “are hybrids and move back and forth between their origin 
and capture by the state”.
115 It is important to note, however, that the capture by the state may not 
always be the prominent output. In some cases, traditional and informal practices may have always 
been either ignored or repressed by the state. Thus, it is always important to develop a local historical 
understanding of the mechanisms. 
Ultimately, a pragmatic approach to those systems is warranted. 
“Neither glorifying [them] as the only cure nor relegating them to the realm of the devilish is 
helpful to people seeking assistance in their suffering. It is only prudent to acknowledge the 
positive potential of traditional rituals and beliefs, not as contradictory or competing with other 
approaches but as complementary to them. To ignore or discard traditional ways that have been 
seek to work in the past makes no sense. On the other hand, they cannot provide the cure for all 
ills.”
116 
In other words, as for any other existing mechanism or institution, a detailed and contextualised pre-
assessment is essential. 
3.5 The interest of hybridation: including informal and traditional mechanisms in reform and 
reconstruction processes 
Increasingly, a middle ground is suggested: one that recognises and supports the hybrid character of 
most systems. While the mainstream approach is centred on the state as the primary provider of a 
number of functions, the reality, in many fragile contexts, is that the state’s capacity to deliver 
efficient and fair services to ordinary people is extremely limited.
117 As Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye 
observe:  
“if we are interested in improving the experience of justice and security of the end user [the 
ordinary person], it seems misguided to focus…on reforming the state security and justice 
agencies. It would make more sense to recognise the nature and composition of the post-conflict 
and fragile state without imposing upon it an idealised Western conception of what the state 
should be; acknowledge its inherent weaknesses and limitations; accept the ways in which state 
and non-state actors inter-penetrate, mingle, and merge, and then, attempt to strengthen the 
performance and capacities of those who actually deliver most of the security and justice in 
addition to building state capacities.”
118  
Two experiences in Sierra Leone show how “official” programmes may successfully include existing 
mechanisms in local communities to facilitate re-integration and disarmament processes or provision 
of justice. The third experience actually constitutes a counter-example; it concerns decentralisation 
programmes, which have largely ignored the role of traditional authorities and the diversity of their 
situations after the end of the war. 
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3.5.1 Traditional reconciliation mechanisms supporting DDR programmes 
In Sierra Leone, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration 
(NCDDR) relied on traditional reconciliation mechanisms to facilitate the re-integration of former 
combatants into communities in areas of critical tension in the south, east and northern parts of the 
country. Indeed, locally, re-integration processes were not always easy. “Ex-combatants fear[ed] they 
[would] be targeted and ostracised, while civilians fear[ed] a return of violence, or resent[ed] the 
crimes the ex-combatants [were] frequently alleged to have committed.”
119 To reduce tension and 
facilitate that re-integration, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-
integration (NCDDR) set up social reconciliation programmes. In potentially serious cases, where war 
crimes were alleged, NCDDR called to traditional leaders to facilitate the return of ex-combatants.
120 
Ex-combatants were encouraged to undertake tasks that might be beneficial to communities, such as 
civil works, street cleaning, and helping to rehabilitate shelter. In addition, a Community Arms 
Collection and Destruction (CACD) programme was established in 2001 to address the large numbers 
of unaccounted for weapons circulating among civilians, and to alleviate the fear of increased 
insecurity and criminality in communities. The public destruction of weapons also served as 
confidence building mechanism among the community in disarmament. The symbolic burning of 
about 3,000 weapons in Lungi Town, on 18 January 2002 marked the completion of the programme.
121 
In this case, most accounts largely praised the way traditional and informal mechanisms existing at 
community level were often involved in the process, for the best. 
3.5.2 Paralegals and a dual system of justice 
An innovative access to justice initiative in post-war Sierra Leone was implemented by Timap for 
Justice, a local non-governmental organization, in collaboration with the Open Society Institute’s 
Justice Initiative and the World Bank. It utilized paralegals and a grassroots approach to address 
problems of justice sector reform. Timap for Justice trains and deploys local paralegals to help regular 
citizens, especially those living in rural areas, address their everyday justice problems through 
education, mediation, organising, and advocacy. Timap’s experience shows how a project providing 
paralegal assistance can help “mediate” between the formal and the informal systems of justice. Vivek 
Maru, one of Timap’s founders, explains the role of these paralegals:  
“Their methods are diverse. For individual justice-related problems, the paralegals provide 
information on rights and procedures, mediate conflicts, and assist clients in dealing with 
government and chiefdom authorities. For community-level problems, paralegals advocate for 
change from above and assist in organising collective action from below. The project employs 
three distinct approaches to reforming customary law and the dualist legal structure. First, the 
formal legal system is sometimes invoked to check unfairness and exploitation in the customary 
system. Where local court decisions are severely unjust, the project’s supervising lawyers will 
lodge appeals in the formal court system to seek both redress for the client and a precedent-setting 
ruling. Sometimes, the very fact that paralegals can speak the formal legal language and are 
associated with formal law is enough to inhibit would be exploiters in the customary setting. […] 
But we are not legal missionaries, banishing the darkness of customary law with the light of the 
formal legal system. Customary institutions, as noted, deserve respect both for their traditional 
origins and for their greater accessibility and relevance to most Sierra Leoneans. A second reform 
effort acknowledges this by working to improve the customary system from within. Paralegals 
identify fair-minded chiefs and elders who can assist with internal advocacy. They hold 
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community meetings to engage people in dialogue on justice issues in the chiefdom. When 
paralegals mediate local conflicts, they provide an alternative and fine-free process that synthesises 
traditional and modern approaches. A paralegal mediating between a delinquent child and a father 
who has resorted to beating might, for example, begin with something from the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and end with the ritual of a child placing his head on his father’s feet. We hope 
that as our paralegals gain respect in their chiefdoms, their presence will decentralize some of the 
power that is now concentrated in the hands of the chieftaincy. Finally, paralegals can serve as 
bridges between the two regimes. One effect of legal dualism is that rural people are marginalised 
from and fearful of the structures of government and the formal legal system. Paralegals have 
assisted rape victims, for example, in pursuing prosecution with the Sierra Leone Police (rape is 
outside the jurisdiction of customary courts). If the government is not paying teachers in a 
particular community, paralegals will raise the issue with the Ministry of Education. Our hope is 
that these piecemeal, grassroots efforts will contribute to a reform of Sierra Leone’s dualist legal 
structure that draws on the experience of ordinary Sierra Leoneans and meets their needs by 
combining the strengths of the formal and customary legal systems, rather than exalting one over 
the other.”
122 
3.5.3 Decentralisation programmes challenging chiefdoms’ authorities 
The decentralisation programmes in post-conflict Sierra Leone provide a revealing counter-example. 
Different donors and agencies (multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental) are involved in different 
decentralisation programmes, with a large diversity of views and, at times, conflicting agendas. They 
have received significant critiques, in particular, for their lack of consideration of the local context and 
their attempt to institute systems according to externally determined structural reform projects. One of 
the crucial points of those critiques regards the way traditional authorities have been dealt with in this 
process. First, not enough attention has been paid as to how to co-ordinate roles between chiefdom 
authorities and the new local councils; this remains a key consideration for devolving control in Sierra 
Leone.
123 Second, during the war, local power structures were deeply challenged, in particular, by 
young belligerents who often perpetuated violence against elders and traditional leaders.
124 This has 
had varying implications on the role played by chiefdoms today and the support they still have in rural 
communities, something that has led to vivid debates, even among scholars who strongly disagree 
about the extent to which these traditional authorities should be maintained, reformed or removed 
altogether.
125 At a minimum, this means that the same approach should not be applied everywhere. 
Such a situation (and the polemic associated with it) reflects both a deficit in knowledge and a lack of 
assessment of local situations on the part of the different agencies intervening in the decentralisation 
programmes. As one analyst noted, “‘one size fits all’ institutional remedies may blind practitioners to 
the political imperatives that bind the rural poor to non-liberal modes of governance and therefore 
leave hastily erected ‘democratic’ institutions vulnerable to political capture by the very forces the 
project seeks to thwart”.
126 The answer is probably not to choose between the two systems, but to find 
                                                      
122 Vivek Maru, “The Challenges of African Legal Dualism: An Experiment in Sierra Leone”, Justice Initiatives, Open 
Society, February 2005. See, also, Vivek Maru, “Between Law and Society: Paralegals and the Provision of Justice 
Services in Sierra Leone and Worldwide”, in: (2006) 31 The Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 427-476. 
123 UNDP, Sierra Leone Human Development Report 2007: Empowering Local Government for Sustainable Human 
Development and Poverty Reduction: The District Focus Approach to Development, (New York: United Nations, 2007), 
p. 36. 
124 Stefan Meyer, “Sierra Leone: Reconstructing a Patrimonial State”, in: (2007) FRIDE Development ‘In Perspective’ Case 
Studies, p. 6.  
125 See, in particular, Edward Sawyer, “Remove or Reform? a Case for (Restructuring) Chiefdom Governance in Post-
Conflict Sierra Leone”, (2008) 107 African Affairs, ppl 387-403, and the comment by Paul Richards published by the 
journal in August 2008. 
126 Richard Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralisation in Post-War Sierra Leone,” 
(2005) 105 Africa Affairs, p. 45. Béatrice Pouligny 
22 
ways to make sure that the parallel systems of local councils and chiefdom
  authority deliver the 
services expected and remain accountable
 to the citizens.
127 
______________________ 
These mechanisms have gained increasing interest in the international community, at least at a 
rhetorical level, as there is a growing recognition of the importance of more holistic approaches. As a 
UNDP report notes, by focusing on “formal institutions”, there is not only a risk of diminishing the 
overall impact of reforms (by overlooking critical components of the existing system) but also of 
limiting opportunities to strengthen the access to crucial services – by ignoring mechanisms which are 
used by, and are more accessible to, local communities.
128  However, concrete support and the 
experience of engaging them in mainstream practices remain relatively limited. In too many cases, 
“justice sector reformers have failed to acknowledge, and thus comprehend, the systems—which, at 
least in rural areas, are predominantly customary, idiosyncratic to specific sub-regional and cultural 
contexts, and residing only in oral form—by which many people (if not most poor people) in 
developing countries order their lives function”.
129 However, these systems assist communities to deal 
with daily conflicts. Paying attention to them is, at the minimum, a way to get a more accurate picture 
of what is actually functioning in a given context. As one observer noted in the context of justice 
reforms, “with increasing discussion about complementarity efforts and local ownership of 
development efforts, should we not also take account of and accept what the local population wants? It 
would be logical to build on the local perception of justice, and thus on systems that are acceptable to 
the local population”.
130 For donors and international agencies, an absolute priority should be to 
enhance understanding of how populations respond to their daily problems when the reach of the state 




4. Better addressing those dimensions: policy recommendations & avenues for future 
research 
It is time for international programmes to move more decisively towards a greater consideration of and 
support of the intangible, qualitative dimensions of state resilience and state-building, including a wide 
range of political, social, cultural, spiritual and emotional resources that African societies present. In 
this concluding section, I would like to suggest some avenues to do so and to make a few concrete 
recommendations. The main points that I suggest to address as important corner stones in the process 
are: 
•  the persistent knowledge deficit; 
•  the necessary shift in donors’ policy and agencies’ priorities; 
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•  the improvement of the design and management of aid programs (in particular with regards to 
pre-assessment and monitoring); 
•  a greater engagement with local societies and support to local ownership. 
4.1 Addressing the persistent knowledge deficit 
A series of major deficits need to be addressed: 
•  The most detailed and empirically documented analyses of local societies are sometimes really 
outdated; in particular, they sometimes date from way before the war. Most recent ethnographic 
work is often too partial to allow larger conclusions to be drawn. Other information rely more on 
outsiders’ anecdotic perceptions. In some cases, (such as in Somalia, DRC, Burundi or Sierra 
Leone), this is, in part, at the origin of lively debates and strong contradictions about the state of 
the society and the actual resources than can be relied on. More financial support is needed for 
the conduct of detailed empirical social research on fragile situations. 
•  Decision-makers and practitioners are faced with a double knowledge gap. First, as they function 
in a “crisis mode”, outsiders, in particular, have little time to think and accumulate knowledge, 
especially about the specific historical, political, and cultural context in which they are going to 
intervene. Second, even in their own practices, they have limited accumulated knowledge. 
International interventions in the field of state-building are relatively recent. And despite roughly 
two decades of experimentation, little is known about how to bring about legal change and create 
sustainable legal institutions in post-conflict countries. “While rule of law reform appears to 
have been moderately successful in the non-conflict context, there are heightened difficulties in 
the post-conflict context (a very low institutional starting point and urgent law and order and 
dispute resolution problems), and there is insufficient analysis or understanding of how to adapt 
these positive experiences smoothly to the post-conflict context.”
132 In most sectors, experts 
confess that they do not know the long-term impact of the measures that they suggest.
133 More 
fundamentally, aid providers “do not know what the process of change consists of and how it 
might be brought about”.
134 Research on international programmes supporting state-building is 
still in its infancy; particularly in some areas such as judicial reforms and, even more, history 
education, memorial work or psycho-social recovery; serious empirical studies are rare. The 
actual impact of such endeavours remains understudied and more time will need to pass to assess 
them accurately. This knowledge deficit is noticeable in all components of the state building 
agenda. One may consider it to be progressively reduced as important good practices are now 
known and better understood, although part of this knowledge remains anecdotal and 
fragmentary. Concrete field experiences need to be documented in depth and in a critical way; 
otherwise, we will continue to suffer of a lack of solid empirical data on which informed 
international programmes could be designed, and then monitored and assessed in depth. 
•  Moreover, this literature remains informed by many normative and theoretical premises as well 
as value-based judgements, more than actual empirical analysis. While some critical literature 
has been developed, in particular, on the ideological framework of the state-building agenda, it is 
not sufficiently connected to empirical studies and to practitioners’ concerns. There is a need to 
bridge those gaps, and produce knowledge which can more adequately answers decision-makers 
and practitioners’ concerns regarding the concrete implementation challenges that they 
encounter. This does not mean that scholars need to follow a research agenda formulated by 
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others, but that they need to be more concerned about the social context in which they work and 
the social use of their production. 
•  There is too little trans-disciplinarity among academics and a lot of disconnection between fields 
of expertise, including in each single sector; this in part explains why so many issues are 
approached in such a technical way. When looking at the intangible dimensions of state 
resilience and state-building, it is clear that the different components of the agenda are 
intrinsically connected and should be better integrated. While everybody agrees on this in theory, 
it is almost never applied in practice. To support such an evolution, we need to develop 
knowledge that answers the nature of the challenges: trans-disciplinary, in-depth, and 
empirically-based. The constitution of trans-disciplinary research agendas and teams needs to be 
encouraged and receives adequate financial support. 
•  We need to diversify the origin of this knowledge and hear more different voices. Very little 
attention is paid to the local understandings of the issues at stake (in the literature on state-
building and peacebuilding, there is very little, if any, reference to this aspect). This means that 
research needs not only to integrate more the points of view of local actors, but also to associate 
local researchers more systematically, and valorise existing local and regional knowledge as 
well as capacities. In international conferences, we too often hear that local universities and 
research capacities would be as “failed” and inexistent as the states are. This generally reflects 
only part of the reality and reveals a lack of both interest and effort on the part of outsiders to 
take the time to identify, meet and assess research capacities in local universities (professors 
and students) as well as local civil society actors, and build concrete partnerships. More 
incentives and financial means are needed to develop such research partnerships. 
4.2 A shift in donors’ policy and agencies’ priorities 
All organisations that have started implementing this process attest to the importance of: 
•  institutional commitment translated into more means; 
•  programmes specially dedicated to address the intangible dimensions of the state-building 
agenda; 
•  staff trained and dedicated to the task.  
This supposes a shift in donors’ policy and agencies’ priorities; contrary to the rhetoric, “funds are 
more willingly affected to quantifiable results than to substantial expenditures”.
135 Additional attention 
needs to be paid to programs which more specifically support individuals and communities in their 
effort to transform their values, belief systems, forms of behaviour and relationships so that they can 
support lasting peace. These have to do with reconciliation processes, memory and history work, 
religion, trauma-healing and psycho-social well-being, as well as the empowerment of individuals and 
groups that are under-represented in the society and run the risk of being excluded and disadvantaged. 
They also require the inclusion of dimensions and expertise that have been largely disconnected from 
the field of peacebuilding until recently, such as the fields of trauma studies, religion studies, 
historiography, memorialisation, or media and arts. Innovative programmes in these different domains 
have been developed by non-governmental organisations in different African countries. They show 
promising avenues but remain too isolated and often lack consistent and durable support. Such 
initiatives need more financial support, including facilitating the exchange of experiences among 
regions and countries. 
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4.3 Improving the design and management of aid programmes: pre-assessment and monitoring 
systems 
“Many state-building efforts involve externally-driven strategies that reflect ignorance of cultural and 
political specificities. They often lack a clear understanding on the kind of states that should be rebuilt 
and the relationship between central state authorities and the society at large.”
136 This diagnosis made 
at a recent international encounter between academics and practitioners is often repeated in the field. It 
partly echoes the knowledge deficit mentioned above, but also refers to a larger deficit in the design 
and management of aid programmes. Improvements are needed at every step of a programme cycle. 
4.3.1 In-depth pre-assessments 
The diagnosis phase is a first crucial step. It means that in-depth qualitative (and not just quantitative) 
pre-assessments are essential. A recent OECD/DAC paper clearly presents the basics of such a work:  
“…State-building policy in any given fragile state must be grounded first and foremost in a 
specific, historically informed assessment of the state of the state. General typologies may be of 
value in helping to identify relevant pathways and lessons, but only at the broadest level. This 
assessment should take note of informal and non-state service provision and security mechanisms, 
as well as those of the state, and pay due regard to informal and non-western forms of 
organisation, rule-making and conflict resolution, whether religious or communal.”
137  
As each actor may conduct parallel assessments and will reach slightly different conclusions, the 
OECD/DAC report recommends “integrated or joint assessment” in order to produce “shared 
strategy”, something that one might consider as not being sufficiently realistic. 
4.3.2 Monitoring mechanisms 
The OECD/DAC report also notes that “as important as locally and historically informed analysis – 
although more amorphous as a point of policy – is the need to recognise that state building is a process 
of negotiation among contending interests. This requires ongoing political analysis of the shifting 
dimensions of the state-formation process. The concept of state building as negotiation should inform 
bilateral and multilateral policy”. This is an important point: situations usually qualified as “fragile” 
correspond to periods of change, including violent ones. Therefore, outsiders, as much as insiders, 
need to be able to understand and monitor what these changes are about. Important changes are 
brought by war and violence, and, as we have seen in a few examples, such changes may be uneven 
and not easy to grasp. Additional transformations may be brought by state-building programmes. 
These changes maybe uneven and may put some individuals and groups in the society (such as women 
and youth, for instance) at greater disadvantage than in the past, or, in contrast, may expand their role, 
depending on which area of their life is concerned. These non-linear evolutions need to be taken into 
consideration more fully. Generally speaking, the different processes referred to in this paper are 
dynamic processes in nature. Their dynamism and diversity are both their strength and one of their key 
challenges. They may be at the origin of a number of contradictions inherent to systems of meanings 
that are heterogeneous by definition. They may contradict visions which, in the name of 
“reconciliation”, would like to promote some forms of consensual visions of the past and the future, a 
forced “order” or illusion of “harmony”.
138 
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All of this calls for a serious improvement in the micro-monitoring of the interventions and their 
impact. Therefore, the focus should be on processes as much as on results of international aid. Here, 
also, a shift is needed in aid practices. An increasing number of field evaluations also look at the 
methodologies involved and qualitative indicators as much as quantitative ones. However, this 
fundamental re-orientation needs to be mainstreamed by donors as well as agencies, and also needs to 
find concrete implications at all levels of intervention. 
4.3.3 Increased attention to the interaction with local societies and cultures 
Cultural awareness and sensitivity is equally essential. Many practitioners and scholars alike 
emphasise the importance of designing programmes and interventions that are culturally appropriate 
and sensitive, taking into consideration communities’ frames of reference and strategies. They stress 
the need to widen the concepts used in the different programmes and to adjust them both for an 
understanding of the cultural meanings of the different dimensions of the state-building agenda and in 
defining strategies that can actually support recovery processes. “Local customs must be respected in 
order not to suppress indigenous values and identities, which tend to be weakened by armed 
conflicts.”
139 Of course, this is easier to state than to do, in order to support an actual dialogue with 
local actors.
140 The respect for local resources and belief systems also requires that their diversity 
(among regions and communities inside a same society) be understood and acknowledged. The 
literature now largely emphasies the need to address these cultural dimensions, and the necessity to 
take on a “do no harm” (DNH) approach,
141 i.e., to be cognisant of the unintended consequences that 
some aid programmes may have. 
A key related issue entails who decides what the local “cultural resources” and norms are and 
presents them to outsiders. This relates not only to an understanding of the power dynamics within 
these societies, but also the strengths and liabilities inherent to them. Outsiders, in particular, need to 
be vigilant in this assessment of their interlocutors (noting that some may be unrepresentative or have 
a stake in maintaining the old order) and put in place processes and mechanisms that allow such 
identification and discussions at community level.
142 Participatory methods and processes help 
enhance ownership of decisions and actions. The need for safe and confidential forums to address 
people’s concerns and help transform conflicts is an important factor. These processes require, from 
outsiders, a particular sensitivity to make sure that they play their limited, but important, roles as 
facilitators of a particular delicate process.
143 
This also means that the aid community and each organisation per se need to put more effort into 
improving knowledge management, taking into consideration the diversity of regions and communities 
with respect to their administrative structures and capacities, economies, social and cultural 
conditions, populations distribution, and financial and workforce resources, local skills and materials, 
etc. This supposes a certain knowledge that needs to be better developed, as suggested earlier in this 
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paper, but also better managed by the organisations, notably through thorough qualitative micro-level 
needs assessment as well as micro-monitoring systems, so that it actually informs daily decisions and 
practices. 
4.4 Engaging more clearly with local societies and supporting local ownership 
All discussions at international level, in particular at the UN, now stress the importance of local 
ownership. This echoes an old and persistent criticism of international aid, in particular, from the host 
societies: international aid programmes tend to be mainly designed and driven from the outside. 
However, a differentiation between involvement and actual ownership must be made. Too often, the 
main moment when beneficiaries are asked to give their opinion is during field assessments; this is too 
limited and too late, and also tends to keep them in a passive role. Local people are asking for active 
roles in the entire project cycle and aid process. They want “a two-way relationship, a sharing of 
know-how and experiences”.
144 This means that concrete mechanisms need to be put in place to reach 
out concretely to the local citizens, involve them in the process and give them oversight roles. This 
means that a “learning culture” needs to be created in which international staff want to learn from the 
local actors and share knowledge because they think that it is useful. This also supposes more 
responsiveness and accountability on the part of international actors towards the local population; the 
lack of those qualities remains one the most fundamental obstacles to the enhanced legitimacy of most 
reform projects.
145 In other words, concrete mechanisms are needed so that the discourse on local 
ownership does not appear as mere rhetoric. 
More efforts and financial resources also need to be devoted to the support to local capacity 
development. The notion of “capacity-development” (defined by UNDP as “a means for strengthening 
and maintaining individuals’, organisations’ and societies’ capabilities to set and achieve their own 
development objectives”)
146 has been gradually replacing the previous notion of “capacity-building” 
which was considered as implying a value judgement about the non-existence of capacities where they 
actually do exist, even in a rudimentary form, and simply need to be unfolded, developed, or 
enhanced. In most situations, some sort of capacities, however nascent or, in part, destroyed, is, 
indeed, present prior to any international presence or any capacity-building work. Efforts should 
therefore be geared towards identifying existing capacities, building on them, supporting them at best. 
New forms of supports also need to be defined, including those which support the development of 
relationships and exchanges between regions and countries in order to share experiences and practices. 
Indeed, it is often surprising to note that local innovative experiences remain unknown in their own 
country. These evolutions are necessary if we want to be serious about better addressing the different 
dimensions of contemporary state fragility. 
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